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  2Abstract 
 
This paper examines corporate governance practices in Costa Rica. First, it 
estimates corporate governance charter measures using firm-level data for 87 
Costa Rican firms and studies their impact on the firms’ performance; here, the 
mean of the corporate governance charters for the publicly traded firms is equal to 
56.14. Second, new evidence is presented on de jure and de facto corporate 
governance charter measures at the firm level and on their effect on the 
performance of the firm. The results indicate that de facto corporate governance is 
better than de jure corporate governance. These results suggest that firms must 
implement a set of additional measures to compensate for the weakness of the 
legal environment. Also, evidence is presented that better corporate governance 
and charter measures are associated with superior firm performance. Third, this 
paper examines the final controllers of publicly and non-publicly traded firms and 
links them with their dividend policies. Family firms are common in Costa Rica 
and are not necessarily linked to better firm performance. Fourth, the ownership 
evolution of Costa Rican firms is studied. Finally, changes in the Commercial 
Code are examined from a good corporate governance practices view. 
  3  41. Introduction 
 
This paper examines corporate governance practices in Costa Rica. First, the whole corporate 
governance charter measure and the de jure and de facto corporate governance asymmetries in 
Costa Rica are described, analyzed and computed. A set of corporate governance charter 
measures was constructed to obtain insights on the effects of corporate governance on firm 
achievement and capital markets.  
The corporate governance measures were constructed using the Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia (CLSA) and IDB questionnaires, and the Corporate Governance Index (CGI) 
database was initially established using the CLSA survey (87 firms). In Costa Rica, the mean 
measure of corporate governance for publicly traded firms is equal to 56.14, following Kappler 
and Love’s (2002) methodology. The worldwide mean is 54.11, excluding Costa Rica. Using the 
IDB questionnaire, the corporate governance index for 66 firms was calculated to be 41.35. 
De jure and de facto corporate governance measures were also computed using the Firm 
Formation Act, the Commerce Code, and the CLSA survey.  Evidence is presented showing the 
existence of significant asymmetries between de jure and de facto corporate governance. In fact, 
the respective means of the de jure and de facto measures are 34.13 and 49.67. 
In general, however, the results suggest that independently of the measure of corporate 
governance used, there is no strong evidence that better corporate governance is associated with 
superior firm performance, the former measured by Tobin’s Q, dividend-to-sale, dividend-to-
earning and earnings-to-sales. 
Second, the set of investor protections was studied, including laws, regulations and 
enforcement on capital markets and firm performance. Here, the law and its enforcement were 
found to have a significant role in the determination of the contracts, particularly between the 
shareholders and the administration board. This promotes the establishment of a subset of de 
facto caveats among the parties. 
Third, the final ownership of Costa Rican publicly and non-publicly traded enterprises 
was studied and it was found that these are mainly family owned. Fourth, the transition from 
ownership at time of establishment to the current public or private (non-family and family) 
ownership is also analyzed. 
  5The lessons learned from these analyses are important because Costa Rica has a 
underdeveloped stock market and also has a moderately strong commerce code, legal system and 
political environment. 
 
National Related Literature 
 
Literature on corporate governance in Costa Rica does not exist. However, after an intense 
search, three works related to legal structure, financial contracts and asymmetric information 
were identified. 
In the first one, Monge-Naranjo, Hall and Cascante (2001) examine the institutional 
determinants of incentives to repay, and their effects on defaults and the design of financial 
contracts in Costa Rica. Enforcement mechanisms help to determine how much is paid back to 
creditors and how much shareholders receive as dividends. Theoretically, however, the most 
important effects will be on the observable characteristics of contracts, as rational agents foresee 
the incentives of other parties. As courts enforce contracts and punish defaulters, they determine 
the form in which contracts take place and the magnitude and direction of investments.  
The paper contains findings on the practices of financial intermediaries that are discussed 
in the context of contract theory, with a focus on the formal financial intermediaries that are 
scattered throughout the country. Much of the information comes from primary sources, 
including a sample of almost 1,700 civil trials and a detailed survey on the credit policies of 31 
intermediaries. This paper reviews the creditor-borrower relationship at all stages—ex ante, 
interim, and ex post. The evidence supports the importance of collateral and other ex post 
repayment incentives. The evidence also suggests that, contrary to the common view, banks are 
not passive lenders. They remain alert as to how well projects perform and rely on previous 
experience and a rather sophisticated informational network in granting credit. 
In the second paper, Arce (1999) studies the existence of adverse selection in health 
insurance contracts provided by the Costa Rica’s Insurance National Institute. Not only does he 
contrast the qualitative implications of the traditional models, but he also employs econometric 
tests on the predictive power of unobservable variables on choice coverage, and the probability 
of accident. The results are mixed on the existence of adverse selection. 
In the third paper, Arce (2001) adapts a model of interdependence between health 
insurance and health services demands. Using a database of 2047 individuals for 1998 provided 
  6by the Insurance National Institute, he concludes that income and insurance prices are the main 
determinants of the coverage choice, while pregnancy and age explained the intensity of the 
health services used. 
This paper is organized as follows. The second section describes and analyzes the Costa 
Rican legal system. Section 3 studies the final controllers of Costa Rica’s publicly and non-
publicly traded firms, banks and the dividend policies of the enterprises. The fourth section 
presents the methodology and quantitative methods used. Section 5 presents the estimation of the 
whole corporate governance index and its impact on firm performance. The sixth section 
computes the de facto and de jure corporate governance charters’ measures and studies their 
impact on the firm performance. Finally, the last section presents the conclusions. 
 
2. Corporate Governance Legal Environment 
 
The corporate governance perspectives of both firms and public policymakers
1 provide a 
framework for corporate governance that reflects the interplay between internal incentives 
(which define the relationship among the key players—insiders and outsiders—in the 
corporation) and external forces (notably policy, legal environment, regulatory framework, and 
the market). These two forces together govern the behavior and performance of the firm. This 
section describes the legal and regulatory external forces that affect the performance of Costa 
Rican firms. Also, it presents examples of the ownership of five publicly traded firms with their 
maps, the measure of government ownership of banks in Costa Rica and the dividend policy 
variables, as originally proposed by La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), 
henceforth referred to as LLSV. 
The legal and judicial architecture in Costa Rica is moderately strong. This architecture is 
based on several laws. First, the Civil Code, created in 1888 and partially modified in 1986, 
regulates private contracts. The Commercial Code (1964) complements the contract regulation, 
while the Civil Procedural Code (1987 and 1996) establishes the judicial process to enforce the 
fulfilling of the original contract by one or two of the parties. Finally, the Stock Market Law 
                                                 
1 The firm perspective: the … consensus is that corporate governance is about maximizing value subject to meeting 
the corporation’s financial and other legal and contractual obligations. The public policy perspective: corporate 
governance is about nurturing enterprise while ensuring accountability in the exercise of power and patronage by 
firms. The role of public policy is to provide firms with the incentives and discipline to minimize the divergence 
between private and social returns and to protect the interests of stakeholders (Iskander and Chamlou, 2000). 
  7(1990) (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores) legislates the actions of the stock market 
participants. 
 
2.1  Commercial, Civil and Procedural Civil Codes 
 
LLSV (1998) report significant differences in the capital markets of countries having different 
types of legal systems. The most notable difference is between countries with a French civil law 
system and those with British common law traditions. Costa Rica is much closer to the civil law 
tradition. The next two subsections suggest that the corresponding values are derived from the 
readings
2 of the Civil and Commercial Codes and Civil Procedural Code (which include the 
Bankruptcy and Judicial Intervention Procedures). 
 
2.1.1 Shareholders’ Rights 
 
Shareholders’ rights, used by LLSV (1998) and applied here to the Costa Rican case, are 
included in the Commercial Code (1964).  Finding that the “shares blocked before meeting” and 
the “mandatory dividend’s legislation” are similar to those in LLSV’s English law country 
sample was unexpected. However, with the exception of oppressed minority rights, Costa Rican 
law is closer to French law. 
Table 1. Shareholders’ Rights 
One share-one vote  Equals 1 if the Company Law of Commercial Code of the country requires 






Proxy by mail allowed  Equals 1 if the Company Law of Commercial Code allows shareholders to 






Shares blocked before 
meeting 
Equals 1 if the Company Law or Commercial Code allows firms to require 
that shareholders deposit their shares prior to a General Shareholders 
Meeting thus preventing them from selling those shares for a number of 




Cumulative voting for 
directors 
Equals 1 if the Company Law or Commercial Code allows shareholders to 
cast all of their votes for one candidate standing for election to the board of 








Equals 1 if the Company Law of Commercial Code grants minority 
shareholders either a judicial venue to challenge the management decisions 
or the right to step up of the company by requiring the company to 
purchase their shares when they object to certain fundamental changes, 
such as mergers, assets dispositions and changes in the articles of 






% of Share of Capital to 
Call an Extraordinary 
Shareholders Meeting 
It is the minimum percentage of ownership of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders Meeting. It ranges 







Mandatory  Dividends  Equals the percentage of the net income that the Company Law or 
Commercial Code requires firms to distribute as dividends among ordinary 




                                                 
2 The results are consistent with Monge-Naranjo, Hall and Cascante’s (2001) interpretation. 
  82.1.2 Creditor Rights 
 
On the other hand, in Table 2 one can observe that Costa Rican creditor rights legislation is 
congruent with the reorganization and bankruptcy processes that create unprotection of creditors’ 
rights.  
Additionally, providing another view of the legal protection of outsiders, Table 3 presents 
the number of bankruptcies (1982-2002) and judicial interventions (1997-2002) presented to the 
civil courts. It must be noted that the 1986 and 1997 changes were caused by a legislation 
reform. 
 
Table 2. Creditors’ Rights 
Restrictions on Filing a 
Reorganization petition 
Equals 1 if the reorganization procedure imposes restrictions, such as 





Automatic Stay on Secured 
Assets 
Equals 1 if the reorganization procedure imposes an automatic stay on the 
assets of the firm upon filing the reorganization petition. This restriction 
prevents secured creditors to gain possession of their security. It equal 0 if 
such restriction does not exist in the law. 
 
1 
Secured Creditors First  Equals 1 if secured creditors are rank first in the distribution of the proceeds 
that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm. Equals 0 if 




Management Stays  Equals 1 if the debtor keeps the administration of its property pending the 
resolution of the reorganization proceeds, and 0 otherwise. Equivalently, this 
variable equals 0 when an official appointed by the court, or by the creditors, 




Legal Reserve  It is percentage of total share capital mandated by Corporate Law to avoid the 
dissolution of an existing firm. It takes a value of zero for countries without 





Table 3. Bankruptcies and Judicial Interventions
3 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Bankruptcies 74 72 65 77 71 191 153 130 248 513 436 68 60 30 76 206 110 94 88 66 81
Interventions 434 1 0 84
Years
  9
                                                 
3 Source: Judicial Statistics (several years), Judicial Branch. 2.2 Stock Market Law 
In Costa Rica, the stock market is relatively new and is regulated by the “Law Regulating the 
Stock Market (LRMV) and the decrees emanating from the (1) Superintendency of Stock Market 
Values (SUGEVAL), an entity in charge of the supervision of the stock market in the country, 
(2) the Council of National Supervision of the Financial System (CONASSIF), a Central Bank 
office that coordinates the financial system, and (3) the National Stock Exchange (BNV). 
In the last six years, an average of 16 firms have participated in the BNV, which was 
created in 1976 under the Banks’ Law (1957). The performance of some of the firms is presented 
in Table 4. All the firms participating in the stock market must be continuously certified by one 
of the three credit ratings firms in the country: “Fitch Costa Rica Calificadora de Riesgo, S.A.,” 
“the Sociedad Calificadora de Riesgo Centroamericana S.A.,” and “Pondera Calificadora de 
Riesgo S.A.” 
 
Table 4. Costa Rican Firms’ Performance 
 
Firm Share Price
Liquid Return (%) Capital Return (%)Total Return (%) (June 2003)
 Atlas Eléctrica S.A. Acciones Comunes   3.49  -28.94     -25.44      25.00  
 Corporación Banex S.A.    0.92     31.07     31.98      2.90  
 Corporación BCT S.A.    7.58     -16.25     -8.66      17.85  
 Corporación Improsa S.A.    3.08     -16.28     -13.20      12.00  
 Corporación Interfin    1.27     16.26     17.53      484.00  
 Durman Esquivel S.A. Acciones Comunes    0.00     -16.56     -16.56      233.33  
 Inmobiliaria Enur S.A.    6.65     10.51     17.16      2615.00  
 Florida Ice and Farm S.A.    3.05     -6.54     -3.49      2199.00  
 Grupo Financiero Improsa Comunes    4.07     -3.81     0.27      2.55  
 Holcim Costa Rica S.A.    4.35     2.65     7.00      8.40  
 La Nación S.A.    2.89     -3.25     -0.36      5.15  
Last Investment Period*
The poor participation of firms in the BNV is obvious when one observes that only 9 
percent of the EKA’s 500 biggest firms in Costa Rica participate in the stock exchange. 
Presumably, this suggests that Costa Rican firms are primarily family or non-public firms, which 
might explain the underdeveloped Costa Rican stock market according to the Burkart, Panunzi 
and Shleifer (2002) model. An additional fact supporting this idea is the recent wave of 
acquisitions and mergers between Costa Rican family firms and foreign public companies. 
  102.3 The Commerce Code 
 
This section describes the main differences in terms of corporate governance between Costa 
Rica’s present Commercial Code, published in 1964 (partially reformed in 1990 and 1997), and 
the 1853 Commercial Code. This comparison is based on differences in the principles of firm 
formation for firms established before and after 1970. 
Differences between a firm’s principles are de facto or de jure; here, only some 
differences of de jure principles inherited from the Commerce Code and actually effective today 
are presented.  
Based on the IDB questionnaire, some old firms were found to have first refusal clauses, 
proxy mail and the ability to devote special attention to the managers’ or directors’ conflict of 
interests. This could be related to the fact that 41 percent of firms in the sample were founded 
with partial or complete foreign capital. Table 5 presents the main differences between the 
Commercial Codes in terms of corporate governance principles. 
 
Table 5. Corporate Governance Principles in Commerce Codes 
1853 1964
One share one vote
Yes, until 10 shares. From 10
to 100 each 5 shares equal to
one vote. For more than 100
shares each 10 shares equal




Yes (Art. 93) No
Legislation on 
Conflict of Interest of 
Manager
Yes (Art. 94) No




20% (Art. 101) 25% (Art. 159)
Minimum Number of 
Members of the 
Board
5 (Art. 83) 3 (Art. 181)
Commerce Code
 
  113. Ownership and Dividend Policies in Costa Rica 
 
3.1  Public and Non-Public Traded Firms 
 
3.1.1 Publicly Traded Firms 
 
Article 34 of the Costa Rican Stock Market Law (LRMV) (Art. 34) defines significant 
participation as the ownership of at least 10 percent of the social capital by one shareholder and 
requires the publicly traded firm to periodically inform SUGEVAL of any change in this 
participation. Moreover, the LRMV requires the firm to provide information about family 
relationships among the members of the Administration and Directors Council. Additionally, the 
law requires the companies to provide information about the tenancy of shares by the 
Administration’s members. Finally, the Administration and Director Council are required to 
provide information to SUGEVAL about the transactions of shares made by Directors’ members 
and their families (up to the third degree of consanguinity). 
In this subsection, using the La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1998) (henceforth 
LLS) ownership definitions (Appendix A), some examples of publicly traded Costa Rican firms’ 
ownership are presented. The information was obtained from each one of the Investment 
Prospects presented by the companies to SUGEVAL. 
 
Table 6. Control of Several Publicly Traded Firms in Costa Rica 
Firm
20% 10%
Florida Ice and Farm S.A.   Widely Held Widely Held
Corporación Interfin Widely Held Financial Widely Held Financial
Metro Free Zone and Business Park Widely Held Family
Grupo Improsa S.A.   Widely Held Pyramid
Inmobiliaria Enur S.A.   Widely Held Widely Held Corporation
Control
 
In the first case, Florida Ice and Farm Co. S.A. (FIFCO) is the most valuable company in 
Costa Rica. Founded in 1908, FIFCO’s primary activity is the production and distribution of 
beer. As of June 2003, no one party has significant ownership, and the total percentage of shares 
owned by the administration is 0.14 percent. 
  12In the second case, Corporación Interfin owns eight financial firms. Among these, 
Interfin Bank owns 33 and 50 percent of the non-public firms Almacenes Bancarios Unidos and 
Interfin-Banex OPC (Pension Fund), respectively. The main shareholder of Corporación Interfin 
(see Figure A.1) is Fiduciaria Sabana Dos Mil S.A, a private firm, with a 60 percent share. The 
Board of Directors of Interfin owns 10.14 percent of the shares, and the sole administration 
member shareholder owns 1.36 percent of the shares. This firm is tentatively defined as “widely 
held financial,” but the owners of Fiduciaria Sabana Dos Mil S.A. were examined to discern 
more about who controls this company.  
In the third case, Metro Free Zone and Business Park (MFZBP) is a firm dedicated to 
developing and operating a free-trade zone and an industrial park. It is 11.97 percent controlled 
by Asesoria Profesional J.B. S.A. (see Figure A.2), whose owner is Jorge Brenes-Ramirez, the 
vice-president of the firm. 
The fourth case is the Grupo Financiero Improsa, which is a financial group whose main 
shareholders are Corporación Improsa S.A. (24.90 percent) and Probanco (20.55 percent). 
Corporación Improsa is a publicly traded firm controlled by La Nela S.A. (29.16 percent), 
Damauri S.A. (18.00 percent) and Remanero S.A. (14.62 percent), all private firms whose 
owners are described in Figure A.3. As far as can be seen, none of the ultimate owners has a 
share of 20 percent or more. However, the firm is controlled by the Ortuño family under the 10 
percent definition. Thus, Grupo Financiero Improsa is a family-controlled pyramid company.  
Finally, Inmobiliaria Enur (Figure A.4) is a firm controlled by Inmobiliaria MxM (52.12 
percent), the biggest supermarket chain in Central America, which is also owned by Central 
American Retail Holding (CARHO), a company controlled by Royal Hold (33.33 percent), a 
Dutch firm; La Fragua/Paiz (33.33 percent), a Guatemalan enterprise; and Corporación 
Supermercados Unidos (CSU) (33.33 percent), a Costa Rican firm. Thus Enur is tentatively 
defined as a widely held corporation,  though it is suspected that CSU is controlled by Rodrigo 
Uribe.
4 
Additionally, the rest of Appendix A presents the ownership structure for another 30 
publicly and non-publicly traded firms. The main, but not surprising, finding is that ownership in 
Costa Rica is basically family-controlled. 
 
                                                 
4 Notice that this firm is not being excluded, although there is important (at least 10 percent) control by a foreign 
company.  
  133.1.2 Non-Publicly Traded Firms 
 
The CLADS questionnaire was applied to 87 firms with the result that 61 percent (53 firms) of 
the firms are family owned, 16 percent (14) are part of a multinational firm and one is a state 
firm.  
 
3.1.3 Ownership Structure in Costa Rica 
 
Figure A.31 presents the ownership structure in Costa Rica. Based on information from the 
Registro Nacional and SUGEVAL on share ownership and board of director members, the 
ownership architecture of 36 of the main public and non-public firms in Costa Rica is presented. 
From this information, it is possible to conclude that 24 families are the owners of these 36 firms 
and that they are interrelated. 
 
3.2 Ownership Transition 
 
This subsection analyzes the transition from a firm’s ownership at the time of its establishment to 
the current public or private (non-family and family) ownership. The main source of information 
is the Registro Nacional. In Costa Rica, once a firm is founded, the Commercial Code and other 
legislation require it to provide details about every change in ownership and on the executive 
board. Thus, the Registro Nacional has accumulated a history of the firms registered in Costa 
Rica, which is usually compiled electronically. 
This information was used to study the evolution of firm ownership. Although the entire 
history of the firms was available, only two time frames were used: the period of the firm’s 
establishment and the most recent activity. The findings are reported in Figure 7. The horizontal 
axis presents the ownership of the firms at the start-up moment (family—regardless of capital 
origin—foreign, and publicly traded) and the vertical axis shows the current ownership status. 
Thus, in the first entry there are 35 firms that were originally family owned and still are. In 
addition, 22 firms (with an average age of 28 years) were initially family owned but are now 
publicly traded. 
Of the 77 firms analyzed, 28.5 percent went from being family-owned to being publicly 
traded. However, the majority of firms (45.5 percent) are still family-owned, which is consistent 
with other results. 
  14Figure 1. Ownership Transition of Firms in Costa Rica, Number of Firms (average age of 
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3.3 Governmental Ownership of Banks 
 
In Costa Rica, the participation of the government in banking has decreased. While in 1996 the 
share of assets owned or controlled by the government of the top 10 banks was 90.9 percent 
(LLS 2000), this share fell to 66.9 percent in 2002. This result is striking because the Costa 
Rican government has not privatized any of its banks. 
Figures 2 and 3 back up the findings by showing an acceleration in the deconcentration of 
the banking industry since the middle of the 1990s, using the most common concentration 
indices applied to the assets of regulated intermediaries.
5 
 
3.4 Dividend Policies  
 
This section presents estimations for some publicly traded firms in Costa Rica, using the LLSV 
(1998) dividend definitions (Appendix A). The information is obtained from each one of the 
Investment Prospects presented by the companies to SUGEVAL. Table 7 summarizes the 
dividend estimations for some publicly traded Costa Rican firms. 
                                                 
5 The following explanation applies: N is the number of firms in an industry and j=1,2,3...,N are the indexes in each 




2 . HH is always between 0 and 1, and the higher it is, the more concentrated the industry. Entropy is defined 
as E = -Σ
N
j=1 pj log2 (pj) . It ranges between 0 and log2(N), and the lower E is, the higher the concentration. Relative 
Entropy is defined as E/log2(N), so its values range between 0 and 1, independently of N. Overall assets rather than 
credit alone are used here, because government debt and other bonds are an important component of banks’ 
portfolios. 
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Table 7. Dividends Estimations 
Firm Low Protection Div/Share Div/CF Div/Earn Div/Sales GS
(Colones) (%) (%) (%) (%)
 Corporación Improsa S.A.   0.42 3.25 23.60 3.30 20.60
 Durman Esquivel S.A. Acciones Comunes   2 234.76 0.96 15.99 0.61 11.00
 Inmobiliaria Enur S.A.   152.00 85.73 92.25 64.84 1.40
 Florida Ice and Farm S.A.   70.00 28.65 95.90 23.35 -3.00
 Holcim Costa Rica S.A.   0.41 11.76 39.05 9.31 1.96
 La Nación S.A.   0.16 7.36 40.13 2.77 -0.43
Value 0
Median 35.21 9.56 39.59 6.31 1.68
 
4  Methodology and Quantitative Methods 
This section addresses the three main areas related to the methodology and data collection. First, 
the proposed methodology is described. Second, the data gathering strategy is delineated. And 
finally, a strategy to avoid inconsistent and missing information from management or the board 
of directors is proposed. 
 
4.1 Panel Data Approach 
 
First, information regarding firms participating in the Costa Rican stock market (BNV) was 
collected and their de jure and de facto corporate governance was examined. Thus, it was 
possible to run de jure and de facto unbalanced panel data regressions (with fixed and/or random 
effects). 
To construct the de jure and de facto corporate governance asymmetries, the company 
law and actual practice were compared through a personal survey (approved by the IDB). The de 
jure and de facto corporate governance indexes were constructed and the Corporate Governance 
Indexes (CGI) reported by Klapper and Love (2002), and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
(henceforth GIM) were set up; other relevant Costa Rican company practices proposed by the 
IDB team were also included.  
  17A CGI similar to the one compiled by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (hereafter referred 
to as CLSA) survey was constructed. This is a composite index of 57 qualitative, binary (yes/no) 
questions, to avoid subjectivity. As in the CLSA survey, each positive question added one point 
to the governance score. Additionally, a CGI was set up using the 28 GIM definitions, when 
applicable. 
Once the de jure and de facto corporate governance charter measures are constructed, 
they will be employed in the quantitative analysis. Additionally, the proposed interviews will 
include a second part with questions about the firm characteristics (size, sector, location, etc.) 
and accounting information. 
Daily information on price shares for 16 firms from 1997 to 2003 was obtained, yielding 
a time series of at least 193 (6x16x2+1) observations and n variables. Information for the 
complete universe of publicly traded firms starting in 1985 was also obtained. 
The 16 firms represent at least eight sectors: (1) Beer, (2) Cement, (3) Press/Newspaper, 
(4) Real Estate, (5) Logistics/Freight, (6) Home appliances, (7) Coffee producers/traders; two 
firms of (7) PVC /plastic; six financial services firms, and (8) one industrial park corporation 
corresponding to several flourishing export-dedicated firms operating under the Export 
Processing Zone regime. 
Let yit be any of the vector of dependent variables (some of them following the (1), (2), 
and (3) specifications suggested in the TORs for this Research Network project) for firm i in 
period t. Also, let xit be any of the vector of independent variables (some of them following the 
(1), (2), and (3) specifications suggested in the TORs for this project) for firm i in period t. 
Finally, ε it is the error term. The following equation is estimated, through the unbalanced panel 
data econometrics: 
yit = βxit + εit 
It must be noted that among the variables are three country-level measures of legal 
efficacy. The first is Judicial Efficiency, the second is Shareholder Rights (calculated as the sum 
of dummies identifying one-share/one-vote, proxy by mail, unblocked shares, cumulative 
vote/proportional representation, preemptive rights, oppressed minority, and percentage of shares 
needed to call a shareholders meeting, per LLSV, 1998) and the third is Legality, which is an 
index of the strength of the legal system and institutional environment constructed as a weighted 
average of Judicial Efficiency (identical to our first index), Rule of Law, Corruption, Risk of 
  18Expropriation, and Risk of Contract Repudiation. This index is constructed using the principal 
components analysis by Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2002). 
 
4.2 Cross-Section Approach 
 
As a second product, a database was established for the year 2002 from the following sources: a 
subset of the EKA 500 biggest firms (constructed from income tax data); the complete group of 
enterprises participating in the Costa Rican stock exchange market; and finally, the entire 
financial sector; which includes  commercial banks, cooperatives and financial enterprises.
6 The 
cooperative sector is also included because the bankruptcy of the two biggest banks in 1997 has 
been strongly associated with the combination of weak de facto corporate governance and strong 
de jure corporate governance. 
EKA, a consulting firm established in 1995, has published since 2000 a list of the 500 
biggest Costa Rican companies. From information on income taxes paid, EKA reconstructs the 
gross revenues of the companies (using a utilities-revenues sector factor calculated from export 
and stock market information), which can be ordered in a decreasing array. 
A sample of 100 firms was selected, and the firm relevant information was collected 
using the times series approach: de jure and de facto corporate governance, individual 
characteristics, price share and accounting information. There was one drawback: a lack of 
access to the firms’ Firm Formation Act (FFA, Acta de Constitución de la Empresa),  meaning 
that the share prices could not be obtained. This problem was solved by obtaining the 
information through the public Property National Register (PNR, Registro Nacional de la 
Propiedad), a unit of the Ministry of Justice, which compiles all the relevant information 
regarding the formation of a firm: founder(s) name(s), initial capital amount, share prices, 
location, changes in ownership of shares, etc. 
Let yt be any of the vector of dependent variables for the complete set of firms in period t. 
Also, let xt be any of the vectors of independent variables for the complete set of firms in period 
t. Finally, ε t is the error term. The following equation was estimated through the OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares), Probit, Logit, Tobit or Poisson econometrics, according with the dependent 
variable definition: 
                                                 
6 It must be noted that the elements in the intersection of these subsets were eliminated. 
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As in Subsection 3.1, a CGI is set up using the Klapper and Love, and GIM definitions. 
Moreover, the three country-level measures of legal efficacy described previously are included. 
It is believed that the Panel Data and Cross-Section Approaches represent good 
complement strategies for establishing the potential differences between de facto and de jure 
corporate governance. Therefore, it is possible to examine the robustness of the causality tests. 
 
4.3  Credibility and Consistency of the Information 
 
In Subsections 4.1 and 4.2, personal surveys were used to collect de facto corporate governance 
behavior. Given that there could exist perverse incentives for management (including the 
Directors Council) to refrain from disclosing all relevant information, or to distort it, the 
information provided by these agents was compared with the reports from the external audits. 
Specifically, the information bias problem was minimized in two ways. First, personal interviews 
with the firm’s private auditors were used and their answers were contrasted with the public 
reports they had prepared. Second, SUGEVAL has an Audit Office watching the movements of 
each firm and its private audits; this information was also used and contrasted with the firm’s 
private audits and management information. 
 
5. Firm Histories  
 
Before the quantitative results are presented, a description of the main features of Costa Rican 
firms is provided. 
5.1 Atlas 
Atlas Electric was founded in 1961 with the objective of producing household appliances. Atlas 
is dedicated to the manufacture and marketing of domestic refrigerators and both electric and gas 
stoves. It also markets washing machines and microwaves. Additionally, it sells its products to 
more than 21 countries including Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, The Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Jamaica and Puerto Rico. Atlas manufactures under 
the brands Atlas, Cetron, Electrolux, White Westinghouse and Frigidaire. 
Since 1976, Atlas has been a public company traded on the stock market. It started with 
common stocks, followed by preferred shares in 1989. Most recently, it emitted standardized 
bonds in 2000. By the year 2002, the number of common stocks was 493,639,204, and the 
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each share. Atlas has three series of standardized bonds: A, B and C. The A-series was issued in 
2000 for an amount of $3,250,000 and a face value of $1,000 per bond; it had a gross rate of 9.95 
percent and a term of two years. The B-series emission was for a total of $3,500,000, with a face 
value of $1,000 per bond due on November 22, 2004, and it offered a gross rate of 10.2 percent. 
Finally, the C-series is the only one available today, and its term ends in 2006. It is for an amount 
of $3,250,000, with the same face value as the others but with a gross rate of 10.6 percent  
In 2002, Atlas’s social capital was composed of authorized social capital, common social 
capital, common stocks, treasury stocks and foreign capital. AB Electrolux (18.41 percent), 
Tobías Kader (13.4 percent) and Tomás Artiñano (10.84 percent) have the main controlling 
interests.  
5.2 Banex 
The Banco Agro Industrial de Exportaciones (Banex) was founded in 1981 and received its 
current name in 1987. It was created with the objective of serving the agricultural and industrial 
sectors as a way of promoting the export of non-traditional goods; it currently offers all kinds of 
banking operations and services, such as the administration of pensions (which started in 2000—
a year later Banex merged its pension firm with Interfin). A dynamic firm, Banex has 
experienced several changes. In 1997, it absorbed the Corporación Continental ABC, S.A. Then, 
in 1999, Banex was bought through the stock market by Banco del Istmo Panamá, which is how 
it became a member of the Grupo Istmo Panamá. Banex’s total social capital is 12.891 million 
colones, and each share has a value of one colon. 
Banex has offered two emissions in the stock market, one in 1982 and the other in 2000. 
The last one consisted of 10 million dollars in standardized bonds with a face value of $41,000. 
The term of this emission was 36 months, expiring in 2003.  
5.3 Cuscatlán 
The Cuscatlán Bank began operating in Costa Rica in 1984 under the name Banco de Fomento 
Agrícola S.A. This name was first changed to BFA S.A and finally to Cuscatlán of Costa Rica 
S.A. This firm was founded with the objective of becoming a regional bank. Today, Cuscatlán 
offers all kind of financial intermediation services throughout the Central American region, 
under the UBC International Corporation (Holding Company). The social capital of Cuscatlán is 
  212,385 million colones (2001), which is represented by 2.4 million shares of common stock, each 
worth 1,000 colones.  
This bank began offering emissions in the local stock market in 1991 and issued the most 
recent emissions in 2001 and 2002 for $10 million and $20 million in standardized bonds (2001 
series A, B, C and 2002 series D, E, F), respectively. Series A and B expired in 2002 and 2004, 
and series C, D, E and F expire in 2006, 2005, 2007 and 2009. Two of their profitability indexes 
are: financial margin 4.83 percent, and net financial margin 8.09 percent. No board members are 
stockholders, and 100 percent of the stocks are the property of Grupo Financiero Cuscatlán de 
Costa Rica, S.A. 
5.4 Banco Interfin 
Corporación Interfin S.A. was founded in 1979 as the Corporación Internacional de Finanzas 
S.A., changing its name to Banco Interfin in 1982.  This bank has focused its operations on 
medium-sized and large firms.  
Nowadays, Interfin Corporation is composed of eight other firms: Banco Interfin, 
Transamerica Bank and Trust Company Ltd., Interfin Valores, Puesto de Bolsa S.A., Interfin 
Banex Pensiones S.A., Corporación Privada de Inverisones de Centroamércia S.A., Arrendadora 
Interfin S.A. (Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Panamá, El Salvador), and Financiera 
Arrendadora Centroamericana S.A. 
The company entered Costa Rica’s stock market in 1983. Since then, the bank has issued 
standardized bonds (series A, B and C) and commercial standardized paper. Its first bond 
emission was in 2000, both in dollars and colones. The three series released (A, B, and C) were 
for an amount of 500,000,000 colones each with a face value of 100,000 colones due in 2003. 
For the dollar emission, the amount was $5 million for each of the series (BB, CC), with a face 
value was of 1,000 dollars. The bank made a second bond emission in 2002 and a third in 2003, 
both of which had three-year due dates 
Today, the only bonds in the market are the ones from series J and HH. The first one is 
for an amount of 2 billion colones with a face value of 1 million. The series HH is in dollars for 
an amount of 5 million and a face value of $10,000. 
Some of the 2002 profitability indexes for this firm were: financial intermediation margin 
to productive assets, 5.59 percent, and net profits to financial revenues, 10.92 percent. For the 
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common stock; and all shares are owned by Corporación Interfin S.A. 
5.5 Cefa 
Cefa Corporation was founded in 1955 under the name of Central Farmaceútica Ltda., adopting 
its current name in 1985. The company is owned by three families: Garnier Oreamuno, Garnier 
Acuña and Rímolo Barquero. Mainly, Cefa is a company that offers goods and services in the 
health and self-care industries, but it also trades in food and photocopy machines. In total, it sells 
around 15,000 different products. This company consists of seven subsidiaries and has 
operations in Nicaragua, Honduras and Costa Rica. The firm employs around 1,000 people. 
In 1989 Cefa began offering emissions in the public stock market. Since 2000 it has 
issued six bond emissions, which vary between series C and D. Its social capital is 100 million 
colones, with 100,000 stocks. All of its capital is from Costa Rica. Its first emission, series C, 
consisted of 150 bonds worth 150 million colones, with a deadline in 2004. Its second emission 
consisted of 200 bonds worth 530 million colones, valid until March of 2003. Finally, its third 
emission, series C, consisted of a total of 400 bonds worth 400 million colones. Its deadline was 
also in 2003.  
Cefa’s net profits-to-total assets was 2.90 percent in 2002, and its net profits-to-total sales 
was 1.70 percent. Its net profits-to-social capital is higher, accounting for 8.50 percent of 
profitability. 
5.6 Durman Esquivel 
In 1959 Arthur Durman Carranza founded Durman Esquivel S.A. First it was involved in the 
commercialization of tubes and in the importation of PVC from Holland. By 1985 it had 
acquired the company PANELEX. Five years later it won the representation of RIB LOC. 
Today, Durman Esquivel has a very important role in the Costa Rican construction industry, but 
it also has production plants and distribution centers in Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, 
and South America, forming the Durman Group. 
This corporation has invested in several firms in Costa Rica and Central America. In fact, 
the Durman Group owns Durman Esquivel Panamá, Durman Esquivel Honduras, Durman 
Esquivel Nicaragua, Durman Esquivel México, PVC Pliducto S.A., Inmobiliaria Interandina 
S.A., Plástica Interandina S.A., and Politubo S.A. 
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standardized bond emission was the series 2003A, 2003B and 2004 in 2000. Its second 
standardized bond emission was series A, B, C and D, and was released in January 2001. A third 
standardized bond emission was also released in 2001: series 2005A, 2006B, 2007C and 2007D. 
In 2002, preferred stocks in series B were offered. The company’s common stocks, series B, 
have also been available since 2001. 
Since 1996, Durman Esquivel has had a gross margin profit of around 33 percent. Its net 
utility to assets has diminished from 16.73 percent to 7.81 percent. As of July of 2003, this 
company had social capital consisting of 186,438,500 shares of common stock with a nominal 
value of 20 colones each. 
This group is mainly owned by the Durman Esquivel brothers: Francis, George and 
Carlos. Their parents, Arthur Durman Carranza and Sylvia Esquivel Goicoechea, are also 
directly involved in the company. Even though the family has an important role, the stockholders 
choose the board of members. 
5.7 Florida Ice and Farm 
On August 5, 1908, the Lindo Morales brothers founded Florida Ice & Farm Co. in San José. In 
1912, Florida Ice & Farm acquired the Traube Brewery. Two years later, Spaniard Manuel 
Ortega founded the Ortega Brewery and began brewing Imperial and Bavaria, among other beer 
brands. In 1957, Florida Ice & Farm bought the Ortega Brewery and have continued to produce 
Imperial and Bavaria to this date. In 1966, the new plant was inaugurated and named Cervecería 
Costa Rica (Costa Rica Brewery). 
That same year, a group of Cubans founded the Tropical Brewery. In August 1970, 
Tropical beer entered the Costa Rican market. After several years of fierce competition, Florida 
Ice & Farm acquired a majority share of the Tropical Brewery in 1977. In 1998, Florida Ice & 
Farm bought out the remaining shareholders, and the two companies merged into one. 
In 1987, Florida Ice & Farm Co. began investing in the rest of Central America through 
participation in Envases del Istmo S.A. (a company producing aluminum cans) and  Comegua 
S.A. (a glass-bottle producer). In 1993, along with various other Central American companies, 
Florida Ice & Farm founded the Central American Brewing Consortium (COCECA) with the 
intention of investing in the Nicaraguan brewing industry. During the 1990s, Florida Ice & Farm 
entered into new business activities, including the Banex Banking Corporation, the Cormar 
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Ecodesarrollo Papagayo S.A. (Papagayo Eco-development). 
In 2002, the company adopted a new corporate structure, in which Florida Ice & Farm 
Co. became the holding company for three main subsidiaries: Florida Bebidas (Florida 
Beverages), Florida Inmobiliaria (Florida Real Estate) and Florida Capitales (Florida Capital). 
Florida Inmobiliaria handles real estate investments, particularly the Papagayo Eco-development 
and the Guanacaste Hotel Development tourism projects. Florida Capitales has also invested in 
other companies, both within and outside of Costa Rica. 
In 2002, Florida established a strategic business alliance with Heineken International 
N.V., one of the world leaders in the brewing industry. This prestigious company purchased 25 
percent of the shares of Florida Bebidas S.A. The new partnership is geared toward creating new 
business opportunities in the beverages industry in Central America. One such opportunity, 
which also materialized in 2002, was the joint acquisition by both companies of Cervecerías 
Barú de Panamá S.A. Heineken is also a partner with Florida and other Central American 
brewers in COCECA (Consorcio Cervecero Centroamericano S.A.), which owns the Nicaraguan 
brewing industry. 
In addition, Florida Bebidas distributes internationally renowned beers such as Budweiser 
from the U.S. and Corona from Mexico. The company also produces and distributes Cristal 
bottled water, Tropical natural fruit drinks, Tampico citrus punch and the soft drink Maxi Malta. 
This firm entered the Costa Rican stock market in 1991. Its social capital is 20 billion 
colones, represented by 200,000,000 shares with a nominal value of 100 colones each. By 2003, 
no one controlled more than 10 percent of sharess. The profitability indexes of this corporation 
are: net profits-to-total assets, 11.16 percent; net profits-to-total sales, 24.08 percent; net profits-
to-social capital, 18.66 percent; and profit-by-share equal to 72.96 percent. 
5.8 Grupo Financiero Improsa 
This company was founded in 1998 under the name of Noche de Alcaracanes S.A. A year later it 
received its current name. This group consists of Banco Improsa S.A., GATX logistics Improsa 
S.A., Gibelartar Sociedad Administradora de Fondos S.A., Arrendadora Improsa S.A., Improsa 
Capital and Impros Seguros S.A. The Group provides financial services in cooperative or mutual 
forms. 
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secondary market and 72,203,562 common stocks in the primary market. Its total common social 
capital is 3.4 billion colones. Also, it has 1,250,000 shares of preferred stock totaling US$1.25 
million, which constitute the company’s preferred social capital. 
The Ortuño family owns this group: Marianela Ortuño Pinto is married to Robert 
Woodbridge Alvarado, her brother-in-law is Mauricio Bruce Jiménez, and her cousins, Alfredo 
Ortuño Victory and Alvaro Carballo Pinto, also are members of the board. 
5.9 Inmobiliaria M x M S.A. (Enur S.A.) 
Inmobiliaria MxM was founded in 1987 and its main activity is selling and renting 
establishments for the operation of supermarkets that are owned by Corporación de 
Supermercados Unidos S.A. and other companies. The social capital of MxM consists of 
15,067,000 shares (including 1,000 preferred shares), each with a value of 1,000 colones. MxM 
also has social capital in 16 other firms, such as Inmobiliaria Enur S.A. (52.12 percent of stocks). 
Enur S.A. has a social capital of 4 billion colones and invests in real estate assets for the 
operation of Palí S.A. supermarkets (Palí S.A. is part of Corporación de Supermercados Unidos 
S.A.). 
In 1999, MxM made an emission of $23 million in guaranteed bonds with deadlines of 
four, five, seven and eight years. Enur S.A. has made five emissions since 1992 with the 
objective of buying new properties. These firms have expanded their investments to Nicaragua. 
The Uribe family is the main owner of this consortium. 
 
6. Corporate Governance Charter Measures 
 
This section describes and analyzes the Corporate Governance Index (CGI) constructed for Costa 
Rica using the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) and IDB Questionnaires (see Appendix 
B). Given that the CGI database was originally constructed using the CLSA survey, only a 
section of the CGI based on the IDB survey will be presented; the analysis will focus mainly on 
the CLSA-based CGI. First, the results for Costa Rica are presented and are then compared with 
the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia survey. Second, the CGI is analyzed for the entire sample 
(public and non-public firms, family firms, etc.). Third, the existence of firm performance 
asymmetries associated with differences in CGI is examined. 
  266.1 Firm-Level Corporate Governance Index 
6.1.1 CLSA Questionnaire  
The corporate governance charter measures were set up using the Klapper and Love (2002) 
approach. In this way, a CGI was constructed that was similar to the one compiled by the CLSA 
survey. This survey is composed of 57 qualitative, binary (yes/no) questions, to avoid 
subjectivity. As in the CLSA survey, each positive question adds one point to the governance 
score. Originally, 100 Costa Rican publicly and non-publicly traded firms were selected using 
the EKA 500 ranking and SUGEVAL database. However, after the elimination of the non- 
responses, a total of 93 enterprises remained, from which 87 complete questionnaires were 
finally obtained. Six firms were dropped because of inconsistencies and a lack of complete 
responses.   
From the final sample, 26 firms are publicly traded and their information was used to 
construct the CGI. Table 7 presents the firm-level CGI basic statistics for Costa Rica and the 
CLSA countries (Kappler and Love, 2002, henceforth referred to as KL).  
 
Table 8. Firm-Level Corporate Governance Index 
Countries Obs Mean Median Min Max Std Dev
Brazil 24 57.26 59.87 43.08 68.22 7.99
Chile 13 61.63 60.62 48.22 69.25 5.18
Costa Rica 19 56.14 62.75 13.73 76.47 16.67
Hong Kong 35 58.27 59.73 30.90 92.77 14.80
India 68 52.78 51.07 32.33 92.52 10.76
Indonesia 16 37.81 38.52 11.77 62.85 12.91
Malaysia 40 54.44 58.64 21.63 78.30 14.40
Pakistan 9 31.85 26.83 17.25 66.68 15.56
Philippines 17 40.72 34.08 19.40 64.35 13.66
Singapore 38 65.34 66.10 45.37 85.97 9.82
South Africa 32 66.53 67.10 42.62 80.38 8.55
South Korea 18 40.66 39.73 33.00 55.82 5.73
Taiwan 37 53.45 53.13 38.95 74.52 8.39
Thailand 18 53.54 49.69 28.33 79.02 14.53
Turkey 9 43.04 46.58 23.43 56.77 12.90
 
Costa Rica is below KL’s sample mean of 54.11 and the median of 54.97; also, Costa 
Rican firms fall below their Latin American counterparts. 
  276.1.2 IDB Questionnaire  
Using the IDB (Inter American Development Bank) Questionnaire, it was possible to gather a 
complete database of corporate governance charter measures for 66 firms.
7 There were several 
data collection problems with the new questionnaire, however. First, most of the firms previously 
surveyed by the CLSA questionnaire (about 80 percent of the sample) said they would not 
respond to the new survey because they had already done one. Second, other companies that said 
they would participate never completed the questionnaire. Thus, it was not possible to obtain 
exactly the same set of firms for the CLSA and IADB surveys.  
Here the main results of the survey are presented. Table 9 shows an IDB Corporate 
Governance Index equal to 41.35. This value is lower than the CLSA Corporate Governance 
Index. The following paragraphs describe the main findings of the survey. 
General Principles: 34.9 percent of Costa Rican firms have issued a “mission statement” 
that explicitly places a priority on good corporate governance. 
Senior Management and the Board: The meetings of the full board were held at least 
once a quarter in 74.6 percent of the firms. Also, more than one-third (33.7 percent) of the 
members of the board are independent. Foreign nationals are on the board in 41.3 percent of the 
firms and come mostly from the United States and Central America. If a manager or a director 
has a conflict of interest in a transaction, he has to disclose such a conflict in 87.3 percent of the 
cases. Also, he is excused from the deliberations on the transaction in 49.2 percent of the cases. 
Finally, he is able to vote on the decision to accept or not accept the transaction in 20.6 percent 
of firms. 
Shareholders: Only 6.7 percent of firms say that they have multiple voting shares. In 
practice, 28 percent of shares are needed to call an Extraordinary Shareholders meeting in Costa 
Rica. 
On Disclosure: Costa Rican firms are audited by an internationally recognized auditing 
firm roughly every five years. The main internationally recognized auditing firms are KPMG, 
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young and Price Waterhouse. In the last three years, 33.9 percent of 
firms have hired a consultant from their external auditors.  
 
                                                 
7 The complete database is available on request. 
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Mean Std Min Max Std/Mean
On General Principles 29.89 29.96 0.00 100.00 1.00
On Senior Management and the Board 45.89 12.94 21.74 86.96 0.28
On Shareholders 46.18 12.36 21.05 78.95 0.27
On Disclosure 37.56 21.91 7.14 85.71 0.58
Corporate Governance Index 41.35 12.76 16.13 75.81 0.31
 
 
6.2  Public versus Non-Public Firms 
Table 10 presents the basic statistics of a subset of variables from the sample. Not surprisingly, 
once the non-publicly traded firms are taken into consideration, the overall CGI (GOV variable) 
decreases, that is, eventually these firms are less careful about the relationship between 
shareholders and the administration than the publicly traded ones. 
The CG Code variable is a dummy equal to one if the firm has a set of written rules that 
regulate the relationship between the shareholders and the administration. As seen in this paper, 
the Costa Rican Commercial Code allows firms to introduce changes in this relationship via the 
Firm Formation Act (FFA) (Acta de Constitución de la Empresa) or via a regulated internal act. 
Generally, this set of rules is included in the FFA. Half of the companies said they have a 
corporate governance code. 
 
Table 10. Complete Sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 84 29.33 19.63 1.00 82.00
National Capital 87 0.60 0.47 0.00 1.00
Foreing Capital 87 0.37 0.46 0.00 1.00
Number Employees 77 361 483 2 3000
Publicly Traded 87 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
CG Code 84 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Discipline 87 45.08 18.36 0.00 77.78
Transparency 87 52.53 27.75 0.00 100.00
Independence 87 44.11 19.80 0.00 87.50
Accountability 87 48.56 24.89 0.00 100.00
Responsibility 87 41.57 20.94 0.00 83.33
Fairness 87 35.52 18.72 0.00 80.00
GOV 87 44.65 15.89 1.96 78.43
 
  29Table 11. CGI Public v Non-Public Firms 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Public
GOV 19 56.14 16.67 13.73 76.47
Non-Public
GOV 68 41.44 14.20 1.96 78.43
 
Table 11 presents the CGI for publicly and non-publicly traded firms. The null hypothesis 
that the CGI mean of the public firms is different from the CGI mean of the non-public ones (i.e., 
their difference is equal to zero), was tested. The two-sample mean t test is equal to 3.84, with a 
probability of rejection of 0.02 percent. Thus, the statement that the publicly traded firms have 
better corporate governance than non-publicly traded ones cannot be rejected.  
This analysis will not make comparisons between the sub-indexes (discipline, 
transparency, etc.) because, as argued by Klapper and Land (2002), intersections probably exist 
among the definitions of the sub-indexes. 
 
Table 12. CGI Family Firms 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GOV 53 41.25 12.77 17.65 70.59
 
The CG index for the Costa Rican family firms is presented in Table 12. It is statistically 
different (lower) than the CGI index for the public traded firms. The associated t is 4.01 and the 
probability of rejection is 0.01 percent. 
 
6.3  Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
6.3.1 Tobin’s Q 
Relationships among the CGI and several firm-related features will now be analyzed. For all 
firms, the level of corporate governance is inversely related to the age of the firm, the local 
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from zero. The CGI is positive related to the number of employees, the foreign origin of capital 
and the performance of the firm measured by the Tobin’s Q. None of these are significantly 
different from zero.  
Table 13 presents the OLS regressions for the effect of corporate governance on the 
Tobin’s-Q measure performance of publicly traded firms. Three alternative specifications are 
employed, also using the sector of origin and size (measured by number of employers) of the 
firm. Using all specifications, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the performance of the 
firm is unrelated to its corporate governance level. Probably, these results are strongly affected 
by the number of observations. However, the Tobin’s Q measure could not be computed for 
seven of the 19 firms because of the suspicion that their market values are an uninformative 
measure of their real value. 
 
Table 13. CGI and Tobin’s Q 
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.316 0.322 0.465
(0.187) (0.189) (0.159)*






N 1 21 21 0
F 2.030 1.390 2.060
Prob > F 0.185 0.299 0.207
R-squared 0.168 0.236 0.508
Adj R-squared 0.085 0.066 0.261
 
  316.3.2 Dividend Policies  
Table 14 presents the preliminary OLS regression results of the effect of corporate governance 
measures on the dividend policies, measured by the dividend-to-earnings and dividend-to-sales 
indicators. In both cases, the measure of corporate governance is negative and significantly 
related to the dividend policies practices. Nevertheless, once other variables are introduced—for 
example, size of the firm—the signicance of the GOV variable disappears. 
The missing data problem was solved, and again the impact of the CGI on the agency 
issues and dividend policies was estimated. 
 
Table 14. Dividend Policies and CGI 
 








Prob > F 0.0177 0.0198
R-squared 0.4824 0.4704












6.3.3 Corporate Ownership 
This subsection provides evidence of the effect of charter measures and ownership on corporate 
performance variables: Tobin’s Q, dividend-to-earnings and dividend-to-sales measures. Given 
the restricted number of observations, the variable ownership is defined as equal to one if the 
firm is widely held (independentof whether it is corporate, financial or widely held in general) 
and zero otherwise. Using this information their effect on the performance of the firm was 
estimated. The ownership of the firm is positively (negatively) related to the dividends polices 
(Tobin’s Q) measures; in all of these cases the coefficient is different from zero (see Table 15). 
The introduction of the charter measure variable (GOV) does not change the sign of the 
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are mainly explained by the corporate governance measure. 
 
Table 15. Corporate Ownership Regressions 
Variable
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant 0.003 3.065 0.060 4.446 0.614 0.364
(0.433) (1.351)* (0.631) (1.996)* (0.068) (0.212)*
Ownership 0.990 0.433 1.490 0.693 -0.077 -0.053
(0.718) (0.632) (1.047) (0.933) (0.097) (0.096)
GOV -0.051 -0.072 0.004
(0.021)* (0.031)* (0.003)
N 1 11 11 11 11 21
F 1.900 4.180 2.020 4.070 0.620 1.090
Prob > F 0.202 0.057 0.189 0.060 0.449 0.376
R-squared 0.174 0.511 0.183 0.505 0.059 0.196
Adj R-squared 0.082 0.389 0.093 0.381 0.017
Dependent




This subsection uses the earnings-to-sales measure of performance to test the effect of the 
corporate governance. The data are collected by the EKA 500 ranking for both publicly and non-
publicly traded firms. It was found that higher corporate governance is associated with lower 
earnings-to-sales measure. This relationship is significant for all the firms, except for the non-
public ones (See Table 16).
8  
 
                                                 
8 In order to avoid methodological mistakes, the EKA 500 earnings-to-sale database was not completed. 












6.5 Earnings and Corporate Governance 
This subsection uses the net earnings measure of performance to test the effect of corporate 
governance. Table 16a presents the main statistics for this variable. The econometric results 
show that higher corporate governance and its corresponding charter measures (Transparency, 
Independence, Accountability, Responsibility and Fairness) are associated with better firm 
performance. Table 16b presents these relationships, which are significant for all the firms. OLS 
regressions with robust standard errors are used. 
 
Table 16a. Net Earnings Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Net Earnings 46 4200102 5721025 253497 25300000
 
 
  34Table 16b. Corporate Governance and Charter Measures Regressions 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant -2950861 5195782 589274 282682 1675607 -191024 1864796















Share Local Capital 1008462 -1128058 42405.3 -728603 -98426 210697 -17327
(0,48) (0,52) (0,02) (0,43) (0,05) (0,11) (0,85)
N 4 64 64 64 64 64 64 6
F 5 . 1 20 . 1 53 . 7 54 . 0 42 . 7 15 . 1 31 . 7 9
P r o b  >  F 0 . 0 10 . 8 60 . 0 30 . 0 20 . 0 70 . 0 10 . 1 7
R-squared 0.15 0.01 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.05
Notes: All regressions include annual time dummies and are estimated by OLS robust standard errors. t-statistics are in 
parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% significance. Net earnings in colones. Charter measures definitions 
according with Klapper and Love (2002).  
 
7. De Jure and De Facto Corporate Governance 
This section provides evidence of the asymmetries in de jure and de facto corporate governance 
charters at the firm level. To compare these charters, a subset of the CLSA questionnaire was 
used. The CLSA survey includes 57 questions but the de facto and de jure charters were based 
on 33 questions given the inherent subjective criteria involved in answering questions like the 
following: “Is it true that there has been no controversy or questions raised over whether the 
board and senior management have made decisions in the past five years that benefited them, at 
the expense of shareholders? (Any loans to group companies/Vs, non-core/non-controlled group-
investments, would mean "No").” The restrictions arise from three considerations. First, the non-
public firms do not have consistent and truthful Acts Books (Libro de Actas). Second, in many 
cases the work of the external audit is unrelated to the use of the firm’s Acts Book and is almost 
  35exclusively related to the finance and accounting practices of the enterprise. Finally, the publicly 
traded firms’ office regulator, SUGEVAL, has released only one sanction in the last five years. 
Thus, 25 questions had to be eliminated in order to avoid the introduction of a bias into the 
responses. 
The de facto indicator was constructed using the CLSA questionnaire. The construction 
of de jure charter was more laborious. The Firm Formation Act (FFA) (Acta de Constitución de 
la Empresa) was obtained for each firm through the Property National Register (PNR, Registro 
Nacional de la Propiedad), and the information was logged into the CLSA questionnaire. In 94 
percent of the cases the firm did not introduce changes to the principles set forth in the 
Commerce Code.  
Table 17 presents the basic statistics of the de jure and de facto corporate measures 
charters:  de jure and de facto corporate governance means asymmetries are significantly 
different from zero at 5 percent for all, publicly traded, non-publicly traded, family and free zone 
firms. 
Table 17. De Jure and De Facto Corporate Governance Charters 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
De Jure
All 87 34.13 3.28 30.30 45.45
Public 19 33.65 3.33 30.30 39.39
Non-Public 68 34.27 3.28 30.30 45.45
Family 32 32.95 2.52 30.30 39.39
Free Zone 14 34.20 2.77 30.30 39.39
De Facto
All 87 49.67 16.82 3.03 84.85
Public 19 61.08 16.42 21.21 84.85
Non-Public 68 46.48 15.60 3.03 84.85
Family 32 39.87 11.93 18.18 66.67
Free Zone 14 45.45 13.86 30.30 84.85
 
  367.1  Firm Performance 
This subsection identifies the impact of asymmetries in de jure and de facto measures on the 
performance of the firm. First, it is important to note that the de facto measures are strongly and 
positively related to the publicly traded firms with respect to the other types of firms. Results not 
significantly different from zero were obtained with the de jure measure (See Table 18). Perhaps 
this suggests that the firms’ governance principles are only legal formalities and do not imply 
better corporate governance. 
 
Table 18. De Jure and De Facto CGI Public Regressions 












The effect of the de jure and de facto corporate governance on the performance measures 
of the firm are presented in Table 19. Without rejecting the possibility that the coefficients are 
biased given the number of observations, one can conclude that higher de facto corporate 
governance measures are associated with lower firm performance. 
 
  37Table 19. De Jure and De Facto Regressions   
Tobin's Q Dividend-to Dividend-to Tobin's Q Dividend-to Dividend-to
Sales Earnings Sales Earnings
Constant 0.261 3.998 5.770 -0.099 3.983 5.582
(0.207) (1.239)* (1.873)* (0.467) (4.241) (6.253)
Gov 0.005 -0.060 -0.086 0.020 -0.110 -0.152
(0.003) (0.020)* (0.030)* (0.013) (0.128) (0.190)
N 1 21 11 11 21 11
F(1,9) 2.400 9.020 7.980 2.100 0.730 0.640
Prob > F 0.152 0.015 0.020 0.178 0.414 0.445
R-squared 0.194 0.501 0.470 0.173 0.075 0.066
De Jure De Facto
1
 
Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis.  One start implies significance at 5 percent. 
 
Next, the earnings-to-sales measure of performance was used to test the effect of de jure 
and de facto corporate governance. On the one hand, higher de jure corporate governance is 
associated (at 5 percent significance level) with lower earnings-to-sales measure for all the 
enterprises except the non-publicly traded ones. On the other hand, de facto corporate 
governance is negative but not significantly related to the firms’ earnings-to-sale performance for 
both the public and non-public samples (see Table 20). 
 
Table 20. Earnings-to-Sales vs. De Jure and De Facto Corporate Governance 
Variable All Non-Public All Non-Public
Constant 0.551 0.494 0.303 0.287
(0.136)* (0.156)* (0.037)* (0.042)*
GOV -0.009 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004)* (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
N 4 63 94 63
F 4.850 2.310 2.240 0.550
Prob > F 0.033 0.137 0.142 0.463
R-squared 0.099 0.059 0.048 0.015
De Jure De Facto
9
 
  388. Conclusion 
The main conclusions of this study are the following. First, it is unclear whether the ultimate 
control of publicly traded firms in Costa Rica lies in the hands of a small group of families or a 
group of non-publicly traded firms. Second, based on the CLSA questionnaire, the corporate 
governance charter measures at firm level were computed for 87 Costa Rican firms, providing 
evidence that publicly traded firms have better corporate governance than the non-public ones. 
However, the null hypothesis that among publicly traded firms better corporate governance is 
associated with a healthier performance was rejected. Additionally, if the origin of a firm’s 
capital is local, then it is associated with worse corporate governance compared to firms whose 
capital origin is foreign. Also, members of a Free Zone enterprise have healthier corporate 
governance than their local counterparts. The firms with the poorest corporate governance are 
family-owned. Finally, there are asymmetries between de facto and de jure corporate governance 
charter measures in Costa Rica. Based on firm data for the 87 firms previously mentioned, the 
governance of the firms was found to be better than what was predicted from their own rules and 
the Commercial Code; at least, the entrepreneurs do not mention that a common subset of rules 
must be written. Again, it cannot be concluded that a superior de facto government must be 
associated with better firm performance. 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1. Definitions of the Variables used in Table 6 
 
Variable Definition 
Low Protection (LLSV 1998)  Equals one if the index of antidirectors rights is smaller or equal 
than three (the sample median). The index of antidirectors rights 
is formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote ([1]) (2) shareholders are 
not required to deposit their shares prior to the General 
Shareholders’ Meeting ([1]); (3) cumulative voting or 
proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors 
is allowed ([1]); (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in 
place  ([0]); (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that 
entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ 
Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent ([0]); (6) or when 
shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waved by a 
shareholders meeting ([1] Art. 147 Commercial Code). The 
range for the index is from zero to six. 
Dividend per Share  Dividends per share in fiscal year 2002. Dividends are defined as 
total cash dividend paid to common and preferred shareholders. 




Dividends as a percentage of cash flow in fiscal year 2002. 
Dividends are defined as total cash dividend paid to common and 
preferred shareholders. Cash flow is measured as the difference 
between total funds from operations and non-cash items from 




Dividends as a percentage of Earnings in fiscal year 2002. 
Dividends are defined as total cash dividends paid to common 
and preferred shareholders. Earnings are measured after taxes and 
interest but before extraordinary items. Source: SUGEVAL. 
Dividend-to-Sales (LLSV 1998) 
 
Dividends as a percentage of sales in fiscal year 1994. Dividends 
are defined as total cash dividends paid to common and preferred 
shareholders. Sales are net sales. Source: SUGEVAL. 
GS (LLSV 1998)  Average annual percentage growth in (net) sales over the period 
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Table A.2. Definitions of the Variables used in Table 5 
 
Variable Definition 
Widely Held (LLS 1998)  Equals 1 if there is no controlling shareholder. (Equal to LLS 
1998) 
Family (LLS 1998)  Equals 1 if a person o a family is the controlling shareholder, and 
0 otherwise. 
State (LLS 1998)  Equals 1 if the (domestic or foreign) state is the controlling 
shareholder, and 0 otherwise. 
Widely Held Financial (LLS 
1998) 
Equals to 1 if a widely held financial company is the controlling 
shareholder, and 0 otherwise. 
Widely Held Corporation (LLS 
1998) 
Equals to 1 if a widely held non-financial company is the 
controlling shareholder, and 0 otherwise. 
Pyramid (LLS 1998)  Equals to 1 if the controlling shareholder exercises control 
through at least one publicly-traded company, and 0 otherwise. 
 
  43At 20%: Widely Held Financial 










Fiduciaria Sabana Dos Mil 
60.00% 
Mkt Capital: US$ 60 mill 
Business: Financial 
Year Founded: 1999 
Source: SUGEVAL 
  44At 20%: Widely Held 









J. Brenes-Ramirez  
100.00% 
Asesoría Profesional J.B. 
11.97% 
Metro Free Zone and Business Park 
Mkt Capital: US$ 0.8 mill 
Business: Business Park 
Year Founded: 1986 
Founder: Group 
Source: SUGEVAL 
  45At 20%: Widely Held 



















Mkt Capital: US$ 5.2 mill 
Business: Financial Group 






















  46At 20%: Widely Held 




















Mkt Capital: US$ 7.1 mill 
Business: Real Exchange 
Year Founded: 1988 
Founder: Rodrigo Uribe 
Source: SUGEVAL 
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At 20%: Widely Held 
At 10%: Family 
 


























Mkt Capital: 2,468,196,020 
colones. 
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At 20%: Widely Held Corporation 
At 10%: Widely Held Corporation 
Others 
2.76% 
Grupo del Istmo  
(Costa Rica) S.A. 
97.24% 
Banco Banex S.A. 
 
Mkt Capital: 12,890,858,550 colones 
Business: Financial Group 








  49At 20%: Widely Held Corporation 
At 10%: Widely Held Corporation   
Figure A.7. Atlas Eléctrica S.A 
 
 























  Mkt capital: 23,253,618,083 
colones 
Business: Financial Group 
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Figure A.8. Banco Cuscatlán de Costa Rica S.A. 
 
 
Grupo financiero Cuscatlán de 
Costa Rica,  S.A. 
100% 
Banco Cuscatlán de Costa Rica, S.A. 
At 20%: Widely Held Financial 

























Mkt Capital: 2,385,200 millioncolones
Business: Financial Group 
Year founded: 1984 
Source.SUGEVAL 
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Mkt Capital: $204,877,109 
Business: Financial Group 
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  At 20%: Widely Held  




                                                            Figure A.10. Banco Improsa S.A 
Mkt Capital: 3,157,366,865 colones 
(common socialcapital), 
$1,250,000,008 (preferred social 
capital)  
Business: Financial Group 






























  53At 20%: Family 




Figure A.11. Banco Bantec S.A 
 
 

























Consorcio Bantec S.A. 
100% 






















Mkt Capital: 5,755,179,633 colones 
Business: Financial Group 




  54At 20%: Family 
At 10%: Widely Held   
 
 












































   
Mkt Capital: 
1,200,000,000colones 
Business: Manufacture group 






































Invexco  Inversora Lega Ariane S.A. 














Mkt Capital:  200,000,000colones 
Business: Commercial group 




  56At 20%: Widely Held Corporation 
At 10%: Widely Held   









S.A.  3.3% 
Condominios 









AEI Inc.  
35.4% 














Mkt Capital:  
1,675,500,000colones 
Business: Financial Groups 















  57Figure A.15. Abonos Superior S.A 
 
 




Corporación de Inversiones Abonos


















At 20%: Widely Held Corporation 




Mkt Capital:  200,000,000colones 
Business: Commercial Group 
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Figure A.16. Dosel S.A 
 
At 20%: Pyramid 





Limited  92% 



















Mkt Capital:  166,036,000 colones 
Business: Tourism Group 
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Mkt Capital:  12,110,599,390 colones 
Business: Financial Group 
Year founded: 1981 
Source: SUGEVAL 
 
At 20%: Widely Held Corporation 
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Financiera Desyfin S.A. 
At 20%: 















Mkt Capital:  12,110,599,390 
colones 
Business: Financial Group 
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Colegio del Valle S.A. 
Inmobiliaria BVS, S.A.  At 20%: Family 

















  Mkt Capital:  33,000,000 colones
Business: Financial Group 










At 20%: Widely Held 
At 10%: Widely Held 
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  Mkt Capital:   
Business: Financial Group 










At 20%: Widely Held Financial 
At 10%: Widely Held Financial 
 












Sociedad Inversiones y Servicios Santo Domingo, S.A. 

















Mkt Capital: 962,400,000 colones 
Business: Financial Group 
Year founded: 1996 
Source: SUGEVAL  At 20%: Family 
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Figure A.22. SFI Corporation S.A. 
 
 

























Mkt Capital: 43,177,000 colones 
Business: Financial service  










At 20%: Widely Held Financial 
At 10% :  
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  Mkt Capital: 12,.000,000 colones 
Business: Real Estate 



















Inmobiliaria comercial del oeste
S.A. 



















Mkt Capital: 475,300,000 colones 
Business: Maintaining real estate 
property and sales. 











At 20%: Widely Held 
At 10% : Family 
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Mkt Capital: 4,525,793,709 colones. 
Business: Publishing, editing  
and production services 
Year Founded: 1946 
Source: SUGEVAL 
Empresa Solera Bennet. S.A 
16.86% 




At 20%: Widely Held 
At 10% : Widely Held
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Figure A.26. La Nación S.A. 
 
 
As of this date, no shareholder has more than 10 percent of
the shares in circulation. 














  Mkt Capital: 20,000,000,000 colones  
Year Founded: 1908 
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Figure A.27. Ingenio Taboga S.A. 
 
At 20%: Family 
At 10% : Family 
 




































  Mkt Capital: 4,200,000,000 colones 
  Business: Agricultural industry  







At 20%: Widely Held 
Financial 
At 10% :Widely Held 
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Figure A.28. Holcim 
 





  Holcemca, BV. 
60% 
Others 






Mkt Capital:  8,604,056,238 colones 
Business: Building 








At 20%:  Widely Held Financial 
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Figure A.29. Banco de San José 
 
Corporación Tenedora 
San José, S.A.  100% 
















Mkt Capital: 12,587,276,949 
colones 
Business: Financial Group 











At 20%:  
At 10% : Widely Held 
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Mkt Capital: 3,728,770,000 colones 
Business: Plastic Industry 
Year founded: 1959. 
Source: SUGEVAL 
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I. CLSA Questionnaire 
 
 – Corporate Governance 
 
Discipline (15%) 
1. Has the company issued a "mission statement" that explicitly places a priority on good 
corporate governance? <…>? 
2. Is senior management incentivised to work towards a higher share price for the 
company eg, <…> expected 
remuneration for the top executive(s) is tied to the value of the shares? 
3. Does management stick to clearly defined core businesses? (Any diversification into 
an unrelated area in last 3 years would count as "No".) 
4. <…> Is management's view of its cost of equity within 10% of a CAPM derived 
estimate? 
5. <…> Is management's estimate of its cost of capital within 10% of our estimate based 
on its capital structure? 
6. Over the past 5 years, is it true that the Company has not issued equity, or warrants for 
new equity, for acquisitions and/or financing new projects where there was any 
controversy over whether the acquisition/project was financially sound? <…> 
7. Does senior management use debt for investments/capex only where ROA (or average 
ROI) is clearly higher than cost of debt and where interest cover is no less than 2.5x? 
<…> 
8. Over the past 5 years, is it true that the company has not built up cash levels <…>? 
9. Does the company's Annual Report include a section devoted to the company's 
performance in implementing corporate governance principles? 
 
Transparency (15%) 
10. Has management disclosed three- or five-year ROA or ROE targets? <…> 
11. Does the company publish its Annual Report within four months of the end of the 
financial year? 
12. Does the company publish/announce semiannual reports within two months of the 
end of the half-year? 
13. Does the company publish/announce quarterly reports within two months of the end 
of the quarter? 
14. Has the public announcement of results been no longer than two working days of the 
Board meeting? <…> 
15. Are the reports clear and informative? (Based on perception of analyst.) <…> 
16. Are accounts presented according to IGAAP? <…> 
17. Does the company consistently disclose major and market sensitive information 
punctually? <…> 
18. Do analysts have good access to senior management? Good access implies 
accessibility soon after results are announced and timely meetings where analysts are 
given all relevant information and are not misled. 
  7519. Does the Company have an English language web-site where results and other 
announcements are updated promptly (no later than one business day)? 
 
Independence (15%) 
20. Is it true that there has been no controversy or questions raised over whether the 
board and senior management have made decisions in the past five years that benefit 
them, at the expense of shareholders? (Any loans to group companies/Vs, non-core/non-
controlled group-investments, would mean "No"). 
21. Is the Chairman an independent, non-executive director? 
22. Does the company have an executive or management committee <…> which is 
substantially different from members of the Board and not believed to be dominated by 
major shareholders? (ie, no more than half are also Board members and major 
shareholder not perceived as dominating executive decision making.) 
23. Does the company have an audit committee? Is it chaired by a perceived genuine 
independent director? 
24. Does the company have a remuneration committee? Is it chaired by a perceived 
genuine independent director? 
25. Does the company have a nominating committee? Is it chaired by a perceived genuine 
independent director? 
26. Are the external auditors of the company in other respects seen to be completely 
unrelated to the company? 
27. Does the board include no direct representatives of banks and other large creditors of 
the company? (Having any representatives is a negative.) 
 
Accountability (15%) 
28. Are the board members and members of the executive/management committee 
substantially different <…>? (ie, no more than half of one committee sits on the other?) 
29. Does the company have non-executive directors who are demonstrably and 
unquestionably independent? (Independence of directors must be demonstrated by either 
being appointed through nomination of non-major shareholders or having on record voted 
on certain issues against the rest of the Board. <…>) 
30. Do independent, non-executive directors account for more than 50% of the Board? 
31. Are there any foreign nationals on the Board <…>? 
32. Are full Board meetings held at least once a quarter? 
33. Are Board members well briefed before Board meetings? <…>(Answers 33-35 must 
be based on direct contact with an independent Board member. If no access is provided 
<…> answer "No" to each question.) 
34. Does the audit committee nominate and conduct a proper review the work of external 
auditors <…>? 
35. Does the audit committee supervise internal audit and accounting procedures <…>? 
 
Responsibility (15%) 
36. If the Board/senior management have made decisions in recent years seen to benefit 
them at the expense of shareholders (cf Q20 above), has the Company been seen as acting 
effectively against individuals responsible and corrected such behavior promptly, ie, 
within 6 months? (If no such case, answer this question as "Yes".) 
  7637. <…> Over the past five years, if there were flagrant business failures or 
misdemeanors, were the persons 
responsible appropriately and voluntarily punished? (If no cases <…> then answer "No.") 
38. Is there any controversy or questions over whether the Board and/or senior 
management take measures to safeguard the interests of all and not just the dominant 
shareholders? <…> 
39. Are there mechanisms to allow punishment of the executive/management committee 
in the event of mismanagement <…>? 
40. Is it true that there have been no controversies/ questions over whether the share 
trading by Board members have been fair, fully transparent, and well intentioned? <…> 




42. Is it true that there have not been any controversy or questions raised over any 
decisions by senior management in the past 5 years where majority shareholders are 
believed to have gained at the expense of minority shareholders? 
43. Do all equity holders have the right to call General Meetings? <…> 
44. Are voting methods easily accessible (eg proxy voting)? 
45. Are all necessary <…> information for General Meetings made available prior to 
General Meeting? 
46. Is senior management unquestionably seen as trying to ensure fair value is reflected 
in the market price of the stock <…>? 
47. Is it true that there have been no questions or perceived controversy over whether the 
Company has issued depositary receipts that benefited primarily major shareholders 
<…>? 
48. Does the majority shareholder group own less than 40% of the company? 
49. Do foreign portfolio managers, and/or domestic portfolio investors who have a track 
record in engaging management on CG issues, own at least 20% of the total shares with 
voting rights? 
50. Does the head of Investor Relations report to either the CEO or a Board member? 
51. <…> Over the past five years, is it true that total directors remuneration has not 
increased faster than net profit after exceptionals? <…> 
 
Social awareness (10%) 
52. Does the company have an explicit (clearly worded) public policy statement that 
emphasizes strict ethical behavior: ie, one that looks at the spirit and not just the letter of 
the law? 
53. Does the company have a policy/culture that prohibits the employment of the under-
aged <…>? 
54. Does the company have an explicit equal employment policy <…>? 
55. Does the Company adhere to specified industry guidelines on sourcing of materials 
<…>? 
56. Is the company explicitly environmentally conscious? <…> 
57. Is it true that the company has no investments operations in Myanmar? 
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II. IDB Questionnaire 
 
– Corporate Governance 
 
On General Principles 
1.  Has the company issued a “mission statement” that explicitly places a priority on 
good corporate governance?   
2.  Does the company’s Annual Report include a section devoted to the company’s 
performance in implementing corporate governance principles? 
3.  Does the company have a code of conduct with corporate governance principles? 
4. Does the company adhere to a local code of best practice? If so, what is its 
compliance rate (how many of the principles does it adhere to? 
5.  Is the firm trading in the stock market? 
6.  What percentage of the shares is trading in the stock exchange? 
7.  Is the company listed on a major foreign stock exchange? Which one? 
 
On Senior Management and the Board 
8.  Are full Board meetings held at least once a quarter?  (Please also indicate frequency) 
9.  What is the size of the board ---how many members? 
10. Are members allowed to send substitutes? 
11. Is the Chairman of the Board and the CEO the same person? 
12. Do the Chairman of the Board and the CEO belong to the same family/controlling 
group? 
13. Do Board members meet alone without management at any time? 
14. Is the Chairman of the Board an independent, non-affiliated director? 
15.  Are there any members of the board that are independent board members? What 
percentage of the board is independent? 
16. Does the company have an audit committee? 
17. What is the composition of the audit committee? Is it only formed by independent 
directors? 
18. Does the company have a corporate governance committee? 
19. Does the audit committee choose the external auditor? 
20.  What is the composition of the committee? Is it only formed by independent 
directors? 
21. Are there any other committees in the board (i.e. compensation, nomination, etc..) 
What is their composition? 
22. Are there any foreign nationals on the board? – Which countries do they come from? 
23. If a manager or a director has a conflict of interest in a transaction (i.e. he owns, is a 
director of, or works in a firm with whom the company is planning to do the 
transaction), does he need to disclose such conflict? Does he need to get out of the 
room for the deliberations on the transaction to take place? Does he vote on the 
decision to accept or not the transaction?  
24. Does the company disclose executive compensation and benefits? 
25. Does the company disclose board compensation and benefits? 
26. Does the company disclose ownership by executives? 
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28. Is any board member also board members/executives of firms belonging to the same 
economic group? How many members fall in this category? 
29. Does the board include representatives of banks and other large creditors of the 
company? 
30. Has there been any sanction to the board or management for violations of Securities 
and/or Corporations laws in the last three years?  
31. Have board members been sanctioned for violations to their general duties in the last 
three years? 
32. Has the board received any complains from shareholders in the last three years? 
33. Is senior management remuneration tied to the value of company shares? 
 
On Shareholders 
34. Does each share have one vote? 
35. Are them multiple voting shares? 
36. Are there shares without votes (non-voting shares) different than preferred shares?  
37. Do any major shareholders of the company hold a disproportionate fraction of control 
rights with respect to his/her cash flow rights (deviations of one-share-one-vote)? 
38. Do shareholders have to be present in the meeting to vote? Can they vote by mail or 
fax? Can they give instructions to management or a representative on how to vote 
their shares? 
39. Is voting easily accessible (eg., proxy voting)? 
40.  What percentage of the shares is needed to call an Extraordinary Shareholders 
meeting? 
41. Can shareholders ask management to include items in the list of topics to be dealt 
with during the shareholders’ meetings?  Can minority shareholders add agenda items 
to the meeting? What percentage of the shares is needed to do so? 
42.  Does the company disclose its ownership structure (i.e. the ownership by large 
shareholders?  
43. Has there been any sanction to the board or management for insider trading and self-
dealing rights in the last three years? 
44. Do shareholders with conflicts of interest in transactions need to disclose the conflicts 
if it goes to a vote to the assembly? Do they need to leave the meeting when 
discussing the transaction? Do they vote on the acceptance of the transaction?  
45.  Do minority shareholders have a mechanism that entitles them to board 
representation?  
46.  Is there cumulative voting or proportional representation for shareholders to get 
represented in the board of directors? 
47. Do minority shareholders have veto rights over key operating and business decisions? 
Which kind of decisions?  
48.  Are there super-majority rules that apply to some key operating and business 
decisions? Which? What percentage of the votes is needed? 
49. Do minority shareholders have rights of first refusal to purchase additional shares at 
the same price they are offered to a third party? 
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thus carries redemption rights? –forcing the controlling shareholder group to buy 
them out later 
51. Can minority shareholders have tag-along rights to sell shares at the same price as the 
controlling shareholder when the company is sold? 
52. Has there been any sanction to the board or management for violations of minority 
shareholder rights in the last three years?  
53. Are there any mechanisms that the company offers to redress dissenting minorities? 
 
On Disclosure 
54. Are accounts presented according to IGAAP?  
55. Has the company been sanctioned for failure to publish company reports timely in the 
last three years? 
56. Does the company publish its Annual Report within four months of the end of the 
financial year? 
57. Does the company publish/announce semiannual reports within two months of the 
end of the half-year? 
58. Does the company publish/announce quarterly reports within two months of the end 
of the quarter? 
59. Has the public announcement of results been no longer than two working days of the 
Board meeting? 
60. Has management disclosed three years performance targets?  
61. Is the external auditing company internationally recognized? What company? How 
long has the firm had it? 
62. Has the company hired its external auditors for consulting purposes in the last three 
years? 
63. Does the company have a website where results and other announcements are updated 
promptly (no later than one business day)? 
64. Does the company disclose ownership information? 
65. Does the company disclose ultimate ownership information? 
66. Does the company disclose compensation information? 
67. Does the company disclose related party transactions and/or conflicts of interest of 
managers and directors on the board? 
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